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The total number of patents produced by a country (or the number of patents produced per
capita) is often used as an indicator for innovation. Here we present evidence that the distribution
of patents amongst applicants within many OECD countries is well-described by power laws with
exponents that vary between 1.66 (Japan) and 2.37 (Poland). Using simulations based on simple
preferential attachment-type rules that generate power laws, we find we can explain some of the
variation in exponents between countries, with countries that have larger numbers of patents per
applicant generally exhibiting smaller exponents in both the simulated and actual data. Similarly
we find that the exponents for most countries are inversely correlated with other indicators of
innovation, such as R&D intensity or the ubiquity of export baskets. This suggests that in more
advanced economies, which tend to have smaller values of the exponent, a greater proportion of the
total number of patents are filed by large companies than in less advanced countries.
Despite the crucial role that firms and their inter-
relationships play in the performance of national
economies, a complete description of this complex sys-
tem has eluded economists. More than a century ago,
one of the fathers of modern economics, Alfred Marshall,
drew on an analogy with forest ecosystems to describe
this system: “. . . we may read a lesson from the young
trees of the forest as they struggle upwards through the
benumbing shade of their older rivals. Many succumb on
the way, and only a few survive. . .And as with the growth
of trees, so it was with the growth of businesses. . . ” [1].
Today we have indications that this may be more than
just a metaphor. Many observations support the idea
that, as with the distribution of biomass and metabolic
rates amongst biological organisms [2], the distribution
of firm sizes follows a power law [3–7].
Power laws seem to abound in economic data. When
aggregated at the city level, quantities such as the num-
ber of new patents, inventors, R&D establishments and
even productivity have been found to follow power law
scaling with respect to city size [8, 9]. Crucially, these
measures of innovation scale super-linearly; larger cities
are more productive per capita than smaller cities [10].
However when patent data is aggregated at the level of
countries, rather than cities or regions, the picture is
entirely different. In contrast to the findings in [8–10]
where data are tightly clustered and show clear super-
linear scaling, the number of patents varies roughly lin-
early with a country’s population and is poorly correlated
in comparison with the results for cities, Fig. 1. Economic
geography tells us that cities exist to exploit the benefits
of agglomeration, so it is not necessarily surprising that
super-linear scaling for cities can be seen in patent data.
Countries exist for more complicated reasons.
In this article we investigate how intellectual property
is distributed in national economic ecosystems. In par-
ticular, we consider the distribution of patents among
applicants within countries and find compelling evidence
that this distribution follows a power law in many in-
stances. However these power laws are not universal:
the best-fit exponents for these distributions differs from
country to country by a statistically significant amount.
This suggests that firms within the ecosystems of dif-
ferent countries experience different environments which
influence their patenting behavior. Using a simple pref-
erential attachment model, based on the Yule process, we
show it is possible to reproduce the qualitative features
observed in the empirical data and to explain some of the
variation of exponents between countries. We also find
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Upper plot: Number of EPO patent
applications (filled triangles) and unique applicants (open
squares) versus national population, for the 22 countries in
the OECD HAN data set. The dashed line indicates the slope
which the data would follow if they scaled linearly — in the
absence of agglomeration effects. Lower plot: Ratio of num-
ber of applicants to number of patents (γ = Napp/Npat) for
the same data. The least squares best fit has a slope of −0.041
and R2 = 0.038 indicating a poor correlation and little depen-
dence on population.
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2that the value of the power law exponent is inversely cor-
related with a number of indicators that are commonly
linked with innovation, such as research and development
(R&D) intensity. Interestingly we find that the value of
the exponent saturates at high R&D intensities.
We use data from the OECD HAN data set from July
2011. This includes patent applications filed at the Eu-
ropean Patent Office (EPO) from 1977–2007 with partial
data from 2007 onwards. The data set covers 22 coun-
tries and has been harmonised to correct for cases where
applicant details have been recorded differently on dif-
ferent patent applications. The use of the harmonised
data is important. When the same analysis was per-
formed with non-harmonised data, large errors resulted
from fragmentation where a single unique applicant ap-
peared as several different applicants due to, for example,
variations in recording the applicant name.
Power law distributions are only one of many right-
skewed, or heavy-tailed distributions. By power law dis-
tribution, we mean one where the probability distribu-
tion, P [X = x] satisfies
P [X = x] = Cx−α for x ≥ xmin
where α is called the power law exponent or scaling pa-
rameter. In the cases we deal with, x is a discrete ran-
dom variable. To ensure the patent distributions are
power laws, we follow the procedure described in [11].
We use a maximum likelihood estimator for a discrete
power law distribution to fit the exponent, and estimate
the power law cut-off xmin [17] by choosing the value
which minimises the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) statistic
D = maxx≥xmin |S(x) − P (x)|, where S(x) is the cumu-
lative density function (CDF) of the data being fitted
and P (x) is the CDF of the fitted model distribution.
The standard deviations of the fitted values were cal-
culated using a boot-strapping method, drawing a se-
quence of points {xˆi ∈ {xi}, i = 1, . . . , n} at random,
uniformly, and with replacement from the original dis-
tribution. The fitted values are listed in Tab. I along
with their estimated standard deviations. The cumula-
tive density functions for the data of the 22 countries and
the fitted power laws are shown in Fig. 2; the fit is gener-
ally strong, with only small deviations between the data
and the fitted models over four orders of magnitude for
most countries.
The values in Tab. I for the standard errors in α and
xmin give us an indication of how precise the estimates
of the best fit parameters are, but they do not tell us
whether the power law model itself is a good fit. The
CDF plots for Austria (AT), Japan (JP), and Switzerland
(CH) show significant weight in the portion of their dis-
tributions where they deviate from the best fit line. This
suggests that a power law model is a poor fit for these
countries, despite the small values of σ(α) and σ(xmin).
To quantify the goodness-of-fit of a power law model
to the empirical data we calculate a so-called p value
TABLE I: The best fit of the empirical data to a power law
model is achieved with a power law exponent α and cut-off
xmin. The estimated standard deviation in these parameters
is given by σ(α) and σ(xmin) respectively. The values for p
indicate the “goodness of fit” of the empirical data to a power
law model. Also given, is Napp the number of applicants and
Npat the total number of patents held.
ISO α σ(α) xmin σ(xmin) p Napp Npat
AT 1.97 0.074827 3 1.0777 0.01 3214 18398
BE 1.93 0.017827 1 0.1 0.24 2746 20470
CA 1.99 0.022143 1 0.3266 0.16 4842 24276
CH 1.86 0.036726 2 1.9159 0.01 7907 74987
CN 2.23 0.031152 1 0.14071 0.81 1930 7879
CZ 2.36 0.12005 1 0.25643 0.16 438 910
DE 1.97 0.059017 18 6.681 0.29 32558 391834
DK 2 0.031161 1 0.39492 0.52 3039 15081
ES 2.13 0.020977 1 0 0.14 3614 10408
FI 1.98 0.053119 3 0.68895 0.36 2289 20378
FR 1.89 0.0096839 1 0.25643 0.45 18317 158608
GB 2.03 0.035597 3 0.98985 0.79 18041 99027
IE 2 0.029475 1 0 0.63 1121 4074
IL 2.11 0.021996 1 0 0.04 3019 9138
IT 2.21 0.0996 7 2.9426 0.99 14255 57260
JP 1.66 0.006795 1 0.17145 0 18121 508774
NL 1.97 0.012978 1 0.2 0.43 7043 79976
NO 2.12 0.027157 1 0.1 0.28 1803 5742
PL 2.37 0.13149 1 0.37753 0.15 523 985
PT 2.27 0.080284 1 0.1 0.29 308 707
SE 2.03 0.015404 1 0 0.42 5998 35655
US 1.87 0.024768 7 2.2293 0.61 55539 654304
[11]. The value of p is essentially the fraction of the
time when we might expect a goodness-of-fit as poor, or
poorer than, that of the empirical data purely due to sta-
tistical fluctuations. A p value of 1 would indicate that
the amount of mis-fit between the data and a power law
is entirely attributable to statistical fluctuations. Values
of p less than a threshold in the range of 0.05 to 0.1 are
typically used to rule out a power law fit. A threshold
of p ≥ 0.1 would exclude only four countries — Austria,
Switzerland, Israel, and Japan. However, the main fea-
ture of Tab. I is that the power law exponents for the
22 countries differ by an amount greater than their es-
timated standard deviations. The exponents mostly lie
between 2 and 2.5, with the exponent for many countries
being close to α = 2 — the threshold below which the
mean value of the distribution diverges. For countries
with α > 2, the expected mean value for the fitted power
law distribution is given by 〈x〉 = (α − 1)/(α − 2)xmin,
hence the expected mean number of patent applications
per firm is large for many of the countries.
Figure 3 shows a plot of the power law exponents and
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FIG. 2: (Color online) CDF plots of EPO patent distributions for all 22 countries, ordered by country code (blue circles) along
with a best fit power law model (black dotted line). The match to a power law fit is generally good.
their estimated standard deviations for each country. We
order the countries by the size of the exponent α. It
is interesting to note that the countries which are often
thought of as having innovative or “high-tech” economies
lie mostly towards the left of the plot, with smaller power
law exponents. The link between small exponents and
economies with highly specialized firms is reinforced by
Fig. 4(b) where the rank of the countries by exponent
is plotted against the rank for the average “ubiquity” of
the goods exported by that country [12] — a measure of
how specialised the goods are. The correlation between
the exponent rank and ubiquity rank indicates that the
power law exponents give information about the presence
of sophisticated (export) sectors in a country. The lower
the value of the power law exponent of a country, the
more likely that the country exports a number of spe-
cialised goods, exported by few other countries.
Having determined that the distribution of patents
amongst applicants follows a power law in many OECD
countries, and that the power law exponent differs be-
tween countries, we now describe a mathematical model
which captures this behaviour. Since it is not clear why
the distribution of patents amongst applicants should
necessarily follow a power law, and since the underly-
ing rules or patterns which lead to such a distribution
for patents is not obvious, it is important that our gener-
ative model follows some set of rules or procedures which
could credibly apply to growth in the number of patents.
There is a large literature on generative models for
power law distributions, going back almost a century [13].
We use a model equivalent to the Yule process [14], based
on two assumptions; 1) growth — the number of appli-
cants with patents increases over time, and 2) preferential
attachment — the likelihood of an existing applicant ac-
quiring a new patent is proportional to the number of
patents that the applicant already holds.
These assumptions lead to the following algorithm: Be-
ginning with a single applicant holding a single patent,
at each time step we either add a new applicant holding
a single patent or add a new patent to an existing ap-
plicant. The rate at which new applicants are added is
determined by the growth rate γ, fixed throughout the
simulation. When a patent is added to an existing appli-
cant the probability that it is attached to applicant i is
given by ki/
∑N
j=1 kj , where kj is the number of patents
held by applicant j and N is the total number of ap-
plicants in the model at that time step. Since only a
single patent is added at each time step, the (inverse of
the) growth rate γ gives (for large N) the average num-
ber of patents per applicant. Since it is desirable that
that a model should reproduce known quantities, such as
the average number of patents per applicant, we choose
γ = Napp/Npat using the data in Tab. I, which ensures
that this quantity matches that observed empirically, and
eliminates the only free parameter in the model.
It is not difficult to prove that such an algorithm pro-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Values of α, with their associated es-
timated uncertainties, for the 22 countries in the EPO HAN
data set, sorted by α, along with average αsim values (and
the associated standard deviations) for simulated data. For
each country’s simulation, the growth rate was determined by
the ratio γ = Napp/Npat from Tab. I.
duces data with a power law tail when the number of
steps taken becomes large [13] and that the power law
exponent for the simulated distribution tends towards
α = 2 + γ [15]. Hence, the exponents of the simulated
distributions are bounded below by 2, approaching this
limit as the average number of patents per applicant be-
comes large.
Using this algorithm we simulated the growth of the
corresponding distribution of patents 500 times for each
country, determining the average value of α and its cor-
responding standard deviation. Fig. 3 shows the values
of α and the estimated standard errors for both the sim-
ulated and empirical data sets, again ordered by α (for
the empirical data). While there are as many countries
for which the error bars of the simulated and empirical
data do not over lap as those for which they do, there
is a clear qualitative fit: countries with lower values of
α in the empirical data, show the same pattern in the
simulated data. In Fig. 4(a) we show the relationship
between the exponent α and the growth rate γ for em-
pirical and simulated data. Both show a clear correlation
although the empirical data consistently has lower expo-
nents than the simulated data. The linear regression fit
for the simulated data is very close to the asymptotically
expected results, so the gap between the simulated and
empirical exponents is not due to the finite duration of
the simulations.
The relatively good agreement between the simulated
and empirical data gives support to the assumption that
applicants holding many patents are more likely to ac-
quire further patents — future innovators are likely to
also be past innovators. However we note that in our
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Left: Best fit exponents for the em-
pirical (filled triangles) and simulated (empty squares) dis-
tributions of each country as a function of γ = Napp/Npat.
The linear least square fits are, respectively, α = 1.78 + 1.12γ
(R2 = 0.81) and αsim = 1.95 + 0.99γ (R
2 = 0.94). Right:
Correlation between the country rank of the empirical power
law exponent and the country rank based on average export
ubiquity (kc,1 in [12]). The dashed line indicates the linear
least-squares fit and has slope 0.71 (R2 = 0.5).
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FIG. 5: Power law exponents for EPO patent distributions
of 22 OECD countries versus GERD (left) and BERD (right)
intensity — gross, resp., business expenditure on R&D as
a percentage of GDP. Vertical bars indicate the estimated
standard error in the α values, horizontal bars indicate the
standard deviation in the time averaged (1995-2006) OECD
data.
model, applicants can continue to acquire patents indef-
initely. Clearly, this assumption is not realistic — ap-
plicant firms can go out of business or be acquired by
other firms. Similarly, a single patent may be owned by
more than one applicant [18] resulting in a network of
co-applicants. Both these effects will alter the patent
distribution from that seen in the simulations.
We also investigate the relationship between the patent
distributions and national expenditures on R&D. In an
innovation ecosystem gross expenditure on research and
development (GERD) and business expenditure on re-
search and development (BERD) might be thought of
playing a role similar to that played by biomass in ecosys-
tems [16]. Just as the total biomass of an ecosystem can
be used to normalise frequency versus body size distribu-
tions such that ecosystems of different sizes can be dire-
fectly compared; rescaling the absolute number of patents
for a country by that country’s absolute GERD or BERD
causes the patent distributions to collapse on one another
(not shown here). However, it is also interesting to see
how the exponent α is related to expenditure on R&D.
To investigate this, we plot the EPO power law ex-
5ponents for the countries in the OECD HAN data set
against GERD and BERD intensity as a percentage of
gross domestic product (GDP): Fig. 5. We see a strong
correlation between increasing intensity of expenditure
on research and development, and lower values of the
power law exponent (corresponding to more innovative
and more sophisticated economies). An interesting fea-
ture is that the decrease in α appears to saturate at about
3% GERD intensity, or 2% BERD intensity. Beyond this
level of R&D expenditure, there is no evidence of further
flattening of the patent distributions. It is also interest-
ing to note that the correlation of α with both GERD
and BERD is the same — a translation of BERD inten-
sity by around 1% almost exactly matches the pattern for
GERD intensity, implying that both BERD and GERD
play similar roles.
In conclusion, we have found that distribution of
patents amongst applicants within OECD countries gen-
erally follow power laws. This provides a new way of look-
ing at the structure of national economies and strength-
ens the analogy between innovating firms and ecosys-
tems. Indeed, we find that the power law exponents that
describe these distributions differ between countries and
are correlated with measures such as national expendi-
ture on research and development, and the ubiquity, or
degree of specialisation, of the basket of goods that a
country exports. Countries that export more specialised
goods tend to have a smaller proportion of companies
that hold a larger share of the patents where countries
that export more ubiquitous goods tend to have a larger
share of patents held in small portfolios. It seems that
the innovator of today is more likely to work in the re-
search laboratory of a large multinational company than
in the suburban garage or small start-up company.
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